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Intervention: The Legality of Armed
Intervention to Address Zimbabwe's
Operation Murambatsvina
BRYAN D. KREYKES
I. INTRODUCTION: OPERATION MURAMBATSVINA
On the morning of May 19, 2005, residents of Harare's urban
townships woke to the rumble of heavy machinery. Operation
Murambatsvina ("Operation" or "Murambatsvina") was about to
begin. Over the next few months, the Zimbabwean government
used the excuse of addressing unlicensed urban settlements to
systematically destroy the homes and businesses of hundreds of
thousands of its citizens.4 Eyewitnesses testified that police forced
citizens to dismantle and burn their property, savagely beating
those who resisted or did not comply quickly enough. Despite
outcry from human rights groups and the international community,
the Operation continued through the months of June and July.
* Law clerk to the Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise, Senior District Judge, United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey; Juris Doctor, New York University
School of Law, 2007. I dedicate this article to the late Thomas M. Franck, a great scholar
and inspiring professor, who first introduced me to its subject matter.
1. The government translation for "Operation Murambatsvina" is "Operation
Restore Order." The literal translation of the Shona word "Murambatsvina," however, is
"clear the filth or dirt." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLEAR THE FILTH: MASS EVICTIONS
AND DEMOLITIONS IN ZIMBABWE 1 n.1 (2005), available at
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/zimbabwe0905/zimbabwe0905.pdf [hereinafter
CLEAR THE FILTH].
2. Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to
Assess the Scope and impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the U.N. Special Envoy on
Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe 12 (2005), http://www.un.org/News/dh/
infocus/zimbabwe/zimbabwe rpt.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 7.
5. Id. at 12.
6. Id. at 13.
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Demolition crews cut a swath through shanty towns and informal
markets with bulldozers and torches.! Every major city in
Zimbabwe was targeted, and almost no area designated as "urban"
was spared.8 In all, Murambatsvina resulted in the forced eviction
of 700,000 people - six percent of the country's total population.
The Zimbabwean government, led by President Robert
Mugabe and his political party ZANU-PF,o justified the
Operation by arguing that it was "aimed at restoring order and
sanity."" Officials claimed that the bulldozing and forced evictions
were necessary to stop disorderly and chaotic urbanization, illicit
trade in foreign currency, and environmental damage caused by
inappropriate urban agricultural practices." Human rights groups
and the opposing political party, Movement for Democratic
Change ("MDC"), however, contended that the Operation was the
result of more sinister motives. Those organizations argued that
the systematic program of evictions and property destruction was
an act of retribution against the urban strongholds of political
opposition to Mugabe. Many observers also expressed the view
that Murambatsvina was a preemptive measure designed to
prevent mass uprisings due to squalid housing conditions, food
insecurity, and unemployment. Finally, economists and activists
argued that , insofar as the program was aimed at unlicensed
businesses, it may have been an effort by the Zimbabwean
government to regain control over the national economy, thereby
returning the country to a system of political patronage overseen
15by ZANU-PF officials.
Sadly, Murambatsvina is typical .of the human rights abuses
that plague Africa. For that reason, the Operation is a useful case
study for assessing the legality of humanitarian intervention to halt
such abuses under applicable regional and international
7. Id. at 12.
8. Id.
9. CLEAR THE FILTH, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Zimbabwe National Television
address of May 20, 2005).
10. Id. at 7, 19.
11. Id. at 14 (quoting Zimbabwe National Television address of May 20,2005).
12. Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 20.
13. CLEAR THE FILTH, supra note 1, at 14.
14. Id. at 1, 7; Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 24.
15. Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 24; see CLEAR THE FILTH, supra note 1, at 14.
16. Amnesty International, Report on Africa 2009, http://thereport.amnesty.org/en/
regions/ africa (last visited June 12, 2009).
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frameworks. The Constitutive Act of the African Union
("Constitutive Act") allows armed intervention to address "grave
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity... ". Although the U.N. Charter's general prohibition
on the unauthorized use of force usually precludes purely
humanitarian intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign
state, 8 the countries that make up the African Union have
consented to such intrusions.'9 Therefore, prior approval by the.
U.N. Security Council will not be required to legitimize armed
interventions authorized pursuant to the Constitutive Act.
It remains to be seen whether the states that comprise the
African Union- many of which are impoverished and unstable -
have the resources and political will to effectively halt
humanitarian crises through the use of force. Even in light of
concerns over its practical effectiveness, though, the African
Union framework for humanitarian intervention is a promising
step in the evolution of international law from a system premised
on state sovereignty to one primarily concerned with guaranteeing
the rights of individuals.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.
Whatever the motivations behind Murambatsvina, it is
beyond question that the forced evictions and destruction of
property involved in the Operation constituted massive and
deliberate human rights violations.20 Murambatsvina was carried
out "in an indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with indifference
to human suffering, and, in repeated cases, with disregard to
several provisions of national and international legal
frameworks." 21 In fact, many human rights advocates and scholars
contend that the violations committed during Murambatsvina rose
22to the level of crimes against humanity.
17. Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h), July 11, 2000, http://www.africa-
union.org/rootlau/AboutAU/ConstitutiveActen.htm [hereinafter Constitutive Act of
the African Union].
18. See U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4.
19. See Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 17.
20. Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 62; see generally CLEAR THE FILTH, supra note 9.
21. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 7.
22. Id. at 64.
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A. National Human Rights Frameworks
By indiscriminately bulldozing shantytowns without giving
effective notice or providing residents sufficient opportunity to
comply with housing statutes, the Zimbabwean government
violated its own laws. The Regional Town and Country Planning
Act, the very law that the government claimed it was enforcing by
destroying illegal dwellings and structures, requires that residents
be served with notice in the form of an "enforcement order" and
given one month to either appeal or come into compliance before
action can be taken to eliminate unlicensed structures.23 No
individualized notice was given to residents during the
24Operation. On the contrary, the City of Harare issued a general
enforcement order on May 24, 2005, which explicitly stated that no
action would be taken until June 20, 2005. In direct violation of
that order and the statutory requirement that citizens be given an
opportunity to appeal, the government began bulldozing a few
days before issuing the enforcement order.26 In areas outside
Harare, no official notice of the impending evictions was ever
issued - residents learned of the Operation from the sound of
bulldozers bearing down on their homes.27
The implementation of Murambatsvina violated not only
national statutory law, but also Zimbabwe's Constitution. Chapter
III of the Constitution includes a Declaration of Rights, which
provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of his freedom of
movement, that is to say, the right to move freely throughout
Zimbabwe, the right to reside in any part of Zimbabwe, the right
to enter and to leave Zimbabwe and immunity from expulsion
from Zimbabwe." During Murambatsvina, however, many
evictees were forced to board trucks that transported them to rural
29outposts where they were detained against their will. Rather than
attempt to legally justify the forced displacement of its citizens
23. Regional Town and Country Planning Act, [29:12] § 32(3) (1998) (Zimb.)
(subjecting enforcement orders to a 30-day waiting period before the government can act
to clear illegal buildings or structures).
24. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 58.
25. Id. (citing Zimbabwe Herald, May 24, 2005).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. ZIMB. CONST. § 22(1), available at http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/cms/
UsefulResourses/ZimbabweConstitution.pdf.
29. Tibaijuka,supra note 2, at 63.
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from urban settlements to rural work camps, the government
simply stated "that all Zimbabweans have a rural home, and that
all those who have been evicted should return to their rural homes
1,0
Murambatsvina was also a direct violation of the
Zimbabwean Constitution's guarantee against the arbitrary
deprivation of property. The Constitution clearly states that
government seizure of property is permissible only when the
authority acquiring or destroying such property gives reasonable
notice of its intent to do so, allows time for the owner of the
property to contest the acquisition by appeal to the courts, and
pays fair compensation. 3' The authorities carrying out the
Operation did not follow those procedural safeguards. Instead,
they seized or destroyed property in urban areas without providing
notice or opportunity to appeal and without paying any
32compensation whatsoever.
B. Regional Human Rights Frameworks
Zimbabwe is a member of the African Union and a party to
13
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("ACHPR").
The ACHPR grants African Union citizens rights such as freedom
of movement, inviolability of property, and access to "the best
attainable state of physical and mental health."36  The
implementation of Murambatsvina violated those rights. As
discussed above, the Zimbabwean government infringed on its
citizens' freedom of movement by forcibly relocating them to rural
30. Id.
31. ZIMB. CONST., ch. III, § 16(b)-(d).
32. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 59.
33. African Union, List of Countries which have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African%20Charter%20on%2OHuman% 2 0an
d%20Peoples%20Rights.pdf.
34. ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) ASSEMBLY OF THE HEADS OF
STATE AND GOVERNMENT, AFRICAN CHARTER OF HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS,
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), art. 12(1) [hereinafter AFRICAN
CHARTER OF HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS] ("Every individual shall have the right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a State provided he abides by
the law.").
35. Id. at art. 14 ("The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be
encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community
and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.").
36. Id. at art. 16(1).
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camps.37 In direct contravention of the ACHPR's provision
regarding the inviolability of property, the Mugabe government
summarily destroyed the homes and businesses of hundreds of
thousands of Zimbabweans. 39 Left with no shelter or financial
resources, thousands of individuals suffering from HIV/AIDS and
other diseases were cut off from effective treatment, thereby
violating their right to the best attainable state of physical and
mental health.
C. International Human Rights Frameworks
Zimbabwe is also a party to a number of international human
41rights treaties. It ratified the' International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") in 1991.42 That
document states in Article 11(1) that "[t]he States Parties to the
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate
food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of
living conditions." 4 3
The Council on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("CESCR"), which is charged with enforcing and clarifying the
rights contained in the ICESCR," ruled in General Comment
Number 4 that "forced evictions are prima facie incompatible with
the requirements of the Covenant and can only be justified in the
most exceptional circumstances . . . .,45 The right to be free from
forcible evictions such as those in Murambatsvina was reaffirmed
in General Comment Number 7, when the CESCR unequivocally
37. Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 63.
38. AFRICAN CHARTER OF HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, supra note 34, art. 14.
39. Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 7.
40. Id. at 39-41, 56-57.
41. See, e.g., U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for .Human Rights, Status by
Country, Zimbabwe, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/newhvstatusbycountry?
OpenView&Start=1&Count =250&Expand=196#196.
42. Id. at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/22bO2Ode6lflObaOcl256a2aoo27bale/
80256404004ff315cl25638b005e5ae2?OpenDocument.
43. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 11(1), U.N. Doc. A16546 (Dec. 16,1966).
44. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 21-22,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, http://www.ohchr.org/englishlaw/cescr.htm [hereinafter
ICESCR].
45. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural
Rights [CESCRI, General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing, T 18, U.N. Doc.
E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991).
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stated that "[e]victions should not result in individuals being
rendered homeless or vulnerable to violations of other human
rights." 46 The Council found that evictions are only permissible
when residents are given individualized prior notice, information
on the government's proposed use of the land, and an opportunity
to invoke legal remedies to halt the seizure of their homes.47
In 1995, Zimbabwe submitted its initial state report to the
CESCR, which highlighted the country's housing crisis. While the
report argued that no domestic legislation prohibited forced
evictions - despite the aforementioned provisions of the Regional
Town and Country Planning Act - Zimbabwe acknowledged that
the only permissible remedies dealing with "illegal" settlements
under the ICESCR are upgrading settlements or relocating
individuals living in squatter colonies to planned residential sites.
In its response to Zimbabwe's state report, the CESCR specifically
stated that any forced evictions undertaken without providing
notice and alternative housing would violate the Covenant and
General Comment Number 4.
By forcibly evicting residents of urban settlements during
Murambatsvina, Zimbabwe violated its obligations under the
ICESCR.5 1 Except for the ineffective and generic notice given in
Harare, the government did not warn evicted individuals of the
impending destruction of their homes and property,5 2 nor did the
government provide alternative accommodations for evicted
46. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural
Rights [CESCR], General Comment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing (art. 11.1),
17, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, Annex IV (May 14, 1997).
47. Id. 1 16.
48. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1 100, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.28
(Sept. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Covenant on Rights].
49. Id. T 116.
50. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural
Rights [CESCR], Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16
and 17 of the Covenant, 21, U.N. Doc E/C.12/1/Add.12 (May 20, 1997) [hereinafter
Consideration of Reports].
51. Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 59-62.
52. The notice given in Harare was published on May 24, 2005, and stated that
evictions would not commence until June 20th of that year. In direct contradiction of that
statement, and in violation of the 30-day notice period required by the Regional Town and
Country Planning Act, the government began demolitions a few days before it issued the
notice. Id. at 58.
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53residents.1 In fact, the evictions rendered 700,000 Zimbabweans
homeless.54 The Zimbabwean government gave no opportunity for
legal appeal, and the national court system was notoriously
unresponsive to efforts by activists seeking injunctions to stop
bulldozing after it had begun.
D. Were Murambatsvina's Violations Crimes Against Humanity?
Numerous human rights advocates and scholars contend that
the Zimbabwe committed crimes against humanity by
implementing the Operation.16 The Rome Statute of 1998, which
established the International Criminal Court, contains the most
authoritative definition of "crimes against humanity" found in
modern international law. Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines
"crimes against humanity" as including the (1) "[d]eportation or
forcible transfer of population" 8 ; (2) "[p]ersecution against any
identifiable group or collectivity on political . . . or other grounds
that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law. . ."; and (3) "[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to
body or to mental or physical health" when those inhumane acts
are "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population . . . "6
A U.N. Special Envoy, sent by then-Secretary-General Kofi
Annan to investigate the Operation, engaged in only a cursory
analysis of possible criminal responsibility in her report and
specifically noted that the issue was beyond her mandate.6 1 The
Envoy went on to express her view that a debate on criminality
"would serve only to distract the attention of the international
community from focusing on the humanitarian crisis facing the
53. See id.
54. Id. at 64.
55. See id. at 12, 60.
56. See, e.g., id. at 64.
57. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. 32/A/Conf. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see
also Geoffrey Robertson, Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, CENTER ON
LAW & GLOBALIZATION, 2006, http://clg.portalxm.com/library/
keytext.cfm?keytextid=124.
58. Rome Statute, supra note 57, art. 7(1)(d).
59. Id. at art. 7(1)(h).
60. Id. at art. 7(1)(k), 7(1).
61. Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 2, 64-67.
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displaced who need immediate assistance."62 The Envoy's report
did, however, touch briefly on the issue of whether the
government's actions had triggered criminal liability by forcibly
evicting citizens from urban townships and clearing shantytowns.
While tentatively concluding that it would be difficult to sustain a
case against Zimbabwe for crimes against humanity, the Envoy
emphasized four factors in her report: (1) the unlawful nature of
the structures that were demolished; (2) the fact that some
individuals were not "forcibly expelled" from their land but rather
chose to remain, even after their homes had been demolished and
possessions destroyed; (3) the general principle of international
law that permits states to derogate human rights in emergency
situations; and (4) the housing crisis and economic hardship faced
by Zimbabwe, which presented the defense of a lack of criminal
intent by government officials.64
The U.N. Special Envoy's analysis relating to crimes against
humanity is flawed. First, the Envoy only addressed whether the
Zimbabwean government committed "deportation or forcible
transfer of population" or "other inhumane acts"; her report made
no finding as to whether the Zimbabwean government violated the
Rome Statute's prohibition of systematic "persecution against any
identifiable group" on the basis of political views. Additionally,
the Envoy determined that Murambatsvina did not involve crimes
against humanity because "some people demolished their own
structures out of fear, the threat of hefty fines, or to salvage
building materials" while "there were others, who, after
demolitions, chose to remain on their demolished property,
making it difficult to make a case for systematic forced
expulsion." 66 That finding failed to take into account the coercive
forces acting on evicted residents and the full definition of
"persecution" contained in the Rome Statute, which states that
"'[p]ersecution' means the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the
identity of the group or collectivity .... "
62. Id. at 66.
63. Id. at 65-66.
64. Id.
65. See id.; Rome Statute, supra note 57, art: 7(2)(h).
66. Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 65.
67. Rome Statute, supra note 57, art. 7(2)(h).
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As previously discussed, the forcible evictions and destruction
of property that occurred during Operation Murambatsvina
deprived hundreds of thousands of individuals of their rights to
unfettered possession of property, freedom of movement, and the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.6961
Murambatsvina destroyed people's homes and livelihoods,
forcing them to live in the open during the onset of winter 0 and
cutting off access to health care for many evictees who suffered
from HIV/AIDS and other diseases. The widespread and
systematic nature of the Operation, its egregious violations of
human rights, and its alleged use by the Mugabe government as a
retributive tool against the political opposition inescapably lead to
the conclusion that Murambatsvina constituted "persecution"
against an identifiable political group.72 Thus, Zimbabwe
committed crimes against humanity by implementing the
Operation.
Finally, the U.N. Special Envoy failed to adequately address
the question of whether Murambatsvina involved crimes against
humanity in the form of "[o]ther inhumane acts... intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health."7 As predicted by the Envoy in her report, the
evictions involved in the Operation resulted in overcrowding, food
shortages, and lack of health care for evictees. The effects were
especially severe for children, pregnant mothers, and individuals
living with HIV/AIDS or other diseases.7 ' Even in the relatively
short time between the commencement of Murambatsvina and the
Envoy's fact-finding mission, reports emerged of deaths caused by
68. Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 56, 62-63. The U.N. Special Envoy specifically found
that these rights, contained in the ICESCR, had been violated. The report stated that
Operation Murambatsvina caused the homelessness and loss of livelihood of 700,000
people, "caus[ing] them to suffer in large numbers." Id. at 64. In light of those findings, the
U.N. Envoy's refusal to characterize the Zimbabwean government's actions as "crimes
against humanity" appears to have been motivated more by political concerns than by a
strict interpretation of applicable legal standards. See id. at 64-65.
69. Id. at 7.
70. The U.N. Special Envoy noted that many displaced individuals are likely to
become ill or die from exposure to the elements. See id. at 34, 36.
71. See id. at 39-41.
72. See id. at 20, for more information on the motivation behind Operation
Murambatsvina.
73. Rome Statute, supra note 57, art. 7(1)(k).
74. Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 37-39.
75. Id. at 38-40.
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exposure and diseases, such as pneumonia and tuberculosis.
Those deaths were an inevitable result of destroying the homes of
hundreds of thousands of people, many of whom were known from
previous reports to be infected with diseases such as tuberculosis
and HIV/AIDS, without providing adequate housing alternatives.77
Zimbabwe's clearing of shantytowns was an intentional and
systematic program, and it was known that such a program would
78cause great suffering to those left homeless. Consequently, the
Mugabe government's actions in perpetrating Operation
Murambatsvina were comprised of "inhumane acts" that
"intentionally caus[ed]great suffering," 79 and rose to the level of
crimes against humanity.80
III. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION FRAMEWORKS
Like other humanitarian crises, Zimbabwe's commission of
crimes against humanity during Operation Murambatsvina raises
the paradoxical question of how state sovereignty should be
reconciled with the enforcement of human rights. The Operation,
however, is distinguished from past abuses in which a state
engaged in widespread and systematic violations of the human
rights of its citizens - such as the Rwandan genocide of 1994 - by
the fact that Zimbabwe, at the time of Murambatsvina, was subject
to an enforcement mechanism permitting outside actors to forcibly
intervene in its internal affairs to halt its actions.8 1 That
mechanism, which is codified in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive
Act of the African Union,82 represents a transformational shift in
international law from a system premised on the inviolable
sovereignty of states to one in which the rights of individuals are
paramount.
76. Id. at 38.
77. Id. at 38-41:
78. See id. at 12-13.
79. Id. at 65.
80. Rome Statute, supra note 57, art. 7(1)(k).
81. African Union, List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the
Constitutive Act of the African Union, http://www.africa-union.org/rootlaulDocuments/
Treaties/List/Constitutive%20Act%20of%20the%20African%20Union.pdf [hereinafter
Constitutive Act List of Countries].; Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 17,
art. 4(h).
82. Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 17, art. 4(h).
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The humanitarian intervention mechanism contained in the
Constitutive Act of the African Union is limited, however, by two
factors. First, any intervention must comply with the terms of the
U.N. Charter. Arguably more significant are the political and
practical constraints under which the mechanism operates.8 It
remains to be seen whether the states that make up the African
Union possess the political will and military clout to effectively
intercede in human rights crises. Even in light of its limitations,
however, the enforcement mechanism contained in the
Constitutive Act of the African Union is a promising step toward a
model of humanitarian intervention capable of ensuring the
human rights of many of the world's most vulnerable citizens.
A. African Union Humanitarian Intervention Frameworks
The African Union was established by the Constitutive Act
on July 11, 2000. Article 4(h) of that document allows "the Union
to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity."86 Thus, the Constitutive
Act lays the foundation for humanitarian interventions to halt
egregious human rights abuses.
Two years after ratifying the Constitutive Act, the African
Union took its first steps toward creating a procedural structure
for implementing the enforcement mechanism contained in Article
4(h) by establishing a Peace and Security Council ("PSC" or "the
Council") for the dual purpose of (1) recommending humanitarian
intervention in cases of "grave circumstances" such as war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity; and (2) overseeing
83. See U.N. Charter, supra note 18, art. 103.
84. See, e.g., African Union, Peace and Security Council, Communiqug of the Twelfth
Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, Doc. PSC/MIN/Comm.(XII) (July 4, 2004)
[hereinafter Communiqud of the Twelfth Meeting of the Peace and Security Council];
African Union, Decision on Darfur, Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.54(III) (July 2004).
85. See Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 17.
86. Id. at art. 4(h).
87. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union art. 7(e), July 9, 2002, http://www.africa-union.org/root/
au/Documents/Treaties/Text/ Protocol-peace%20and%20security.pdf ("[T]he Peace and
Security Council shall recommend to the Assembly, pursuant to Article 4(h) of the
Constitutive Act, intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of
grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined
in relevant international conventions and instruments.").
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subsequent military and reconstructive efforts.8 The PSC
functions as a regional equivalent to the U.N. Security Council by
designating threats or "grave circumstances" and authorizing the
89use of force to address those threats.
The PSC is made up of 15 Members" who are elected based
on "the principle of equitable regional representation and rotation
. . . . It meets on a continuing basis and is required to hold
meetings at least twice per month, making it more capable of
responding quickly to humanitarian crises than the African Union
Assembly (which meets only once each year). 92 In any meeting of
the PSC, two-thirds of the members are required to form a
quorum, and a two-thirds majority of any quorum is needed to
authorize action. 93 Unlike the U.N. Security Council, no member is
given a permanent seat or veto.
1. Determination of "Grave Circumstances"
The Protocol that established the PSC grants that body the
power to "recommend to the Assembly, pursuant to Article 4(h)
of the Constitutive Act, intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a
Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in
relevant international conventions and instruments[.]"9 ' Implicit in
88. Id. at art. 6 ("The Peace and Security Council shall perform functions in the
following areas ... (d) peace support operations and intervention, pursuant to article 4 (h)
and () of the Constitutive Act; (e) peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; (f)
humanitarian action and disaster management.").
89. See id.
90. See id. at art. 5(1).
91. Id. at art. 5(2). A number of other criteria are specified in Article 5(2) for use in
electing Members. Under Article 5(3) of the Protocol establishing the PSC, state
representatives are eligible for immediate reelection at the expiration of their term. These
two factors result in a partially merit-based system whereby a state with an outstanding
record of adherence to human rights and the principles contained in Article 4 of the
Constitutive Act could, theoretically, retain a seat on the PSC as long as the other African
Union Member States recognized those accomplishments and continued to grant a seat in
appreciation.
92. See id. at art. 8(1), art. 8(2); see also Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra
note 17, art. 6(3).
93. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union, supra note 87, art. 8(8), (13).
94. Id. at art. 5, 8(13); U.N. Security Council Members,
http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp.
95. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union, supra note 87, art. 7(1)(e).
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this reporting function is the duty to apply the definitions
contained in "relevant international conventions and
96instruments" to the actions of member states in order to
determine whether those actions give rise to "grave
circumstances." Thus, the PSC serves as an adjudicator of
international law.
The PSC's function of designating "grave circumstances" is
similar to the U.N. Security Council's power to "determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression . . . ." However, in an apparent response to the latter
body's inability to react quickly in previous humanitarian crises,
the PSC is designed for swift action aimed at halting abuse before
it can lead to large-scale loss of life or property. The Protocol that
established the PSC specifically states that it should "anticipate
and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead
to genocide and crimes against humanity"18 by usinga strategy-of
"early responses to contain crisis situations . . . ." In order to
make the anticipation of humanitarian crises possible, the Protocol
that established the PSC requires that it create a "Continental
Early Warning System"'0o and "develop an early warning module
based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social,
military and humanitarian indicators, which shall be used to
analyze developments within the continent and to recommend the
best course of action."'o The aforementioned provisions grant the
PSC two powers that the U.N. Security Council has never
exercised: (1) rather than waiting for conflicts to develop before
authorizing intervention, the PSC may use anticipatory force to
avoid future conflicts; 10 2 and (2) rather than responding to threats
on an ad hoc basis, the PSC may develop a "module" that would
96. As previously mentioned, the most authoritative definitions of "war crimes,"
"genocide," and "crimes against humanity" are contained in the Rome Statute, supra note
57, art. 6-8.
97. U.N. Charter, supra note 18, art. 39.
98. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union, supra note 87, art. 7(1)(a).
99. Id. at art. 4(b).
100. Id. at art. 12(1).
101. Id. at art. 12(4). At the time of writing, the PSC had not yet established a
standardized "module" as to what actions constitute "war crimes," "genocide," or "crimes
against humanity."
102. Id. at art. 12.
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include standardized response contingencies in which certain
actions would automatically give rise to "grave circumstances." 0 '
In developing a module for designating future abuses as
"grave circumstances," the PSC is likely to be guided by decisions
of the Court of Justice of the African Union ("CJAU"). Under
African Union protocols, the CJAU has jurisdiction over all
disputes relating to "the interpretation and application of the
[Constitutive] Act"10 or "any question of international law"105 and
may give an advisory opinion on "any legal question at the request
of ... the Peace and Security Council . .. 0."6 Consequently, the
CJAU has the power to determine whether a given state's actions
constitute genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity as
defined by the Rome Statute. Decisions by the CJAU may provide
direct guidance in cases where they are rendered before the PSC
decides whether to authorize intervention. However, given the
exigent nature of the "grave circumstances" in which intervention
is proper (all of which involve irreparable loss of life and property)
and the delays inherent in adjudicating disputes, it is more likely
that past CJAU rulings regarding separate but analogous
humanitarian crises will be used as precedent for determining
whether a state's actions justify intervention. As the CJAU
develops a more and more comprehensive body of case law
relating to humanitarian crises, its decisions may form the basis for
an increasingly sophisticated PSC contingency plan outlining
whether intervention is appropriate.
The CJAU never addressed the issue of whether
Murambatsvina constituted crimes against humanity. Indeed, since
Zimbabwe had not ratified the Protocol that created the Court at
the time of the Operation, it had no jurisdiction over the state's
actions. On the other hand, Zimbabwe had acceded to. the
103. Id. at art. 7(e).
104. Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, art. 19(l)(a), July 11, 2003,
http://www.africa-union.org/rootlau/Documents/Treaties/Text/
Protocol%20to%20the%20African%20Court%20of%20Justice%20-%20Maputo.pdf.
105. Id. at art. 19(1)(c).
106. Id. at art. 44(1).
107. Id. at art. 18(3) ("The Court shall have no jurisdiction to deal with a dispute
involving a Member State that has not ratified this Protocol."); African Union, List of
Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol of the Court of Justice of
the African Union, http://www.africa-union.org/rootlau/Documents/Treaties/List/
Protocol%20on%20the%20Court %20of%20Justice.pdf.
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Constitutive Act and the Protocol establishing the PSC.'as
Therefore, the PSC could have independently determined whether
Zimbabwe's actions in perpetrating Murambatsvina constituted
crimes against humanity.
2. Recommendation of Humanitarian Intervention
After determining that a state's actions constitute genocide,
war crimes, or crimes against humanity, the PSC may recommend
forcible intervention in that country to the African Union
Assembly, which may then authorize military action.1 The
Assembly is required to meet only once a year, and the PSC does
not have the explicit authority to call an extraordinary session to
debate a recommended intervention."' However, it could
effectively do so by advancing a motion through one of the PSC
member states that voted in favor of recommending
intervention.112 After a motion is advanced, an extraordinary
session of the Assembly will be held if two-thirds of African Union
member states agree to do so. Since the threshold for obtaining
an extraordinary session of the Assembly - a two-thirds vote of the
member states - is the same as the one for approving a
recommended intervention,"' it is likely that military force will be
authorized in nearly all cases where the procedural hurdle of
obtaining an extraordinary session is cleared. Conversely, a vote
against holding an extraordinary session may be a means of
opposing intervention while avoiding the political repercussions
that would stem from publicly tolerating the abuse in question.
108. Constitutive Act List of Countries, supra note8l; African Union, List of Countries
Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of
the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, http://www.africa-
union.org/rootlau/Documents/Treaties/List/Peace%20and%20Security%20Protocol.pdf.
109. See Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of
the African Union, supra note 87, art. 7(1).
110. Id. at art. 7(1)(e); Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 17, art. 4(h).
111. See Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of
the African Union, supra note 87, art. 8(8), (13); Constitutive Act of the African Union,
supra note 17, art. 6(3).
112. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union, supra note 87, art. 8(8), (13). Two-thirds of the 15 PSC members are
required to form a quorum, and a two-thirds vote of any quorum is required to
recommend intervention. Therefore, at least seven states must vote in favor of
intervention to make a recommendation to the Assembly.
113. Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 17, art. 6(3).
114. See id. at art. 7(1).
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Once the Assembly approves a humanitarian intervention,
the PSC is charged with overseeing the planning and execution of
military operations, along with post-conflict reconstruction
efforts. 1 To aid in that task, African Union treaties provide for an
"African StandbX Force" comprised of military units from the
member states. In addition to combat troops, the African
Standby Force will consist of a Military Staff Committee made up
of senior military officers, which will advise the PSC regarding
regional conflicts and potential interventions." If humanitarian
intervention is recommended by the PSC and authorized by the
Assembly, states that have contributed troops to the African
Standby Force will be required to place those units at the disposal
of commanders appointed by the PSC for the duration of
peacekeeping activities."
Treaty provisions laying the groundwork for the African
Standby Force represent an effort to solve one of the problems
that has plagued the U.N. Security Council since its inception: the
lack of any independent military capability to enforce its
decisions. ' As of yet, however, no African Union member state
has contributed troops to the Standby Force, and no Military Staff
Committee has been established. Whether African Union
member states will cede control of their military units to a regional
body, and whether the PSC can establish command and control
mechanisms that are sufficiently flexible to respond quickly to
115. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union, supra note 87, art. 3(b)-(c), 6(d).
116. Id. at art. 13.
117. Id. at art. 13(8)-(12).
118. Id. at art. 13(6)-(7), (17) (discussing chain of command and troop contribution
requirements).
119. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 24-31 (2002) [hereinafter RECOURSE TO FORCE].
Article 43 of the U.N. Charter calls for a similar military establishment. Member States
were called upon to make military units available pursuant to agreements that were to be
negotiated on the Security Council's initiative. No agreements were ever negotiated,
though, and the Security Council has been forced to rely on ad hoc forces put together for
specific missions or the armed forces of willing Member States in order to enforce its
decisions.
120. See Vanessa Kent & Mark Malan, The African Standby Force: Progress and
Prospects, 12(3) AFR. SEC REV. 71, 72-73 (2003); see also JEFFERY E. MARSHALL,
BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE TO PROMOTE AFRICAN
STABILITY, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PROSPERITY 5 (Crisis States Research. Centre
Apr. 2009), available at http://www.crisisstates.com/download/dp/dpl6.pdf.
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humanitarian crises while maintaining effective oversight of
military operations, remains to be seen.
Even if the African Standby Force is never established,
humanitarian interventions could be carried out by using ad hoc
forces under the command of the PSC or by authorizing willing
states to intercede on behalf of the African Union. Under such a
model, the African Union would operate in much the same
manner as the U.N. Security Council has done for the past 65
years. 12 The Constitutive Act grants the African Union the right of
humanitarian intervention, but not the various member states.
That system is analogous to the collective security structure laid
out in the U.N. Charter, which grants the Security Council - not
the individual member states - the power to use force in the event
that it finds the existence of a "threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression . . . ."123 The practice of the U.N.
Security Council, however, has been to authorize willing states to
use force on its behalf.124 In the event that the Security Council
finds a threat to peace, it authorizes willin2 member states to "use
all necessary means" to address that threat.
The African Union Assembly could act similarly by
authorizing willing states to use all means necessary to halt
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity committed by
any member state prior to the establishment of the African
Standby Force. In fact, nothing in the Constitutive Act or other
African Union treaties prohibits the Assembly from authorizing
126
intervention by states outside the African Union. The
Constitutive Act enumerates "the right of the [African] Union to
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the
121. See S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc S/1511 (June 27, 1950) (authorizing the use of force in
the Korean War by recommending "that the Members of the United Nations furnish such
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to
restore international peace and security in the area."); S.C. Res. 678, T[ 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/0678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (authorizing the use of force in "Operation Desert Storm" by
requesting that Member States "use all necessary means" to reverse Iraqi aggression
against Kuwait).
122. Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 17, art. 4(h) (enumerating "the
right of the [African] Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances.") (emphasis added).
123. U.N. Charter, supra note 18, art. 39, 42.
124. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 678, supra note 121; S.C. Res. 83, supra note 121.
125. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 121.
126. See, e.g., Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 17.
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Assembly in respect of grave circumstances" 12 but places no limits
on the military forces used to effectuate that intervention. Thus, if
the Constitutive Act is interpreted in the same manner as the U.N.
Charter - as allowing the Assembly to authorize individual states
to use force in carrying out its directives rather than acting on its
own behalf - the Assembly may overcome the obstacle to
intervention posed by the limited military resources of African
Union states by allowing forces from more powerful countries to
address human rights abuses. While authorizing outside countries
to forcibly intervene within an African Union state may be
criticized on the grounds that it erodes the sovereignty of African
nations, such concerns are largely alleviated by the procedural
requirement that two-thirds of African Union member states must
vote in favor of intervention to authorize such an action. Given
that hurdle, intervention will likely be allowed only in cases of the
most universally-recognized and egregious human rights abuses -
exactly the circumstances in which swift action, whether it comes
from inside or outside of the African Union, will be most
needed.129
3. Amendments to Article 4(h)
A mere three years after adopting the Constitutive Act, the
African Union promulgated a Protocol that amended the
127. Id. at art. 4(h).
128. Id. at art. 4(h), 7.
129. The ongoing crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan illustrates the high threshold for
humanitarian intervention under African Union frameworks, along with the continuing
lack of political will necessary to undertake such actions. Despite widespread reports of
systematic violence in which the Sudanese government utilized local militia to end a
rebellion by terrorizing the population of that region, the PSC refused to recommend
humanitarian intervention in 2004. The PSC found that "even though the crisis in Darfur
is grave, with unacceptable level of deaths, human suffering and destructions of homes and
infrastructure, the situation cannot be defined as a genocide." Communique of the Twelfth
Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, supra note 84, 2. That decision was echoed by
the African Union Assembly in July of that year. African Union, Decision on Darfur, 2,
Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.54(III) (July 2004). Neither body addressed the question of
whether Sudan's actions constituted war crimes or crimes against humanity. However, in
March 2009, the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Sudanese
President Omar Hassan Bashir in which it found that Sudan's actions in Darfur included
both war crimes and crimes against humanity, including "murder, extermination, forcible
transfer, torture and rape." Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of
Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.It remains to be seen whether the African Union will act
on that ruling by authorizing humanitarian intervention.
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enforcement mechanism in Article 4(h) to allow for "the right of
the [African] Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances,
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well
as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability
to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of
the Peace and Security Council[.]"13 Thus, the amended version of
Article 4(h) expands the right of the African Union to intervene
militarily in the internal affairs of a member state, which was
previously limited to humanitarian crises involving genocide, war
crimes, or crimes against humanity, to include a second option: a
"serious threat to legitimate order."13
The amended version of Article 4(h) closely resembles the
132original text proposed during debates on the Constitutive Act.
That version was rejected due to concerns that providing a right of
intervention to address situations that pose a "serious threat to
legitimate order" without providing a definition of the terms
"serious threat" and "legitimate order" would result in relativistic
and selective enforcement, which would erode the general
prohibitions on the use of force contained in both the Constitutive
Act and the U.N. Charter.' Additionally, the inclusion of a right
of intervention to restore "legitimate order" raises the possibility
that the enforcement mechanism, though originally meant to
address humanitarian crises, will be utilized by corrut
governments to squelch popular rebellions and political dissent.
The amendments to the Constitutive Act have not yet entered
into force."' The current version of the enforcement mechanism
130. Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h),
July 11, 2003, http://www.africa-union.org/rootlau/Documents/Treaties/Text/
Protocol%20on%20 Amendments%20to%20the%20Constitutive%20Act.pdf.
131. Id.
132. Tiyanjana Maluwa, The OAU/African Union and International Law: Mapping
New Boundaries or Revising Old Terrain?, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 232, 235 (2004).
133. Id. at 236. The terms "serious threat" and "legitimate order" are left wholly
undefined by the Constitutive Act and the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive
Act.
134. For an opposing viewpoint, see id. at 236-38 (arguing that a certain amount of
ambiguity regarding the appropriateness of intervention may be desirable as a means of
allowing the PSC discretion to make factual determinations on a case-by-case basis, rather
than applying a bright-line rule that may be insufficiently adaptable to deal with future
crises).
135. At the time of writing, 21 of the 53 African Union member states had ratified the
Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act. African Union, List of Countries that
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contained in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act allows for
military intervention only in humanitarian crises involving
genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Since the
amended version of Article 4(h) simply adds a second set of
circumstances in which military intervention may be permitted, the
eventual adoption of that version will have no effect on the right of
the African Union to authorize humanitarian intervention to halt
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.
. B. Humanitarian Intervention and the U.N. Charter
At first glance, the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the
African Union that allow for humanitarian intervention appear to
conflict with the U.N. Charter. The latter document contains a
general prohibition on the use of force, which states that "[a]ll
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." 137 The U.N. Charter
contains only two exceptions to that general prohibition: Article 51
allows for armed action in self-defense, while Article 42 has been
interpreted as allowing individual member states to use military
force in order to address threats to international peace when
have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of
the African Union, http://www.africa-union.org/rootlaulDocuments/Treaties/List/
Protocol%20on%2Othe%2OAmendments%20to%20the%2OConstitutive%2OAct.pdf.
Two thirds of the states in the African Union must ratify the Protocol before it will
become effective. Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 17, art. 32(3).
136. Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 17, art. 4(h).
137. U.N. Charter, supra note 18, art. 2, para. 4.
138. Id. at art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security."). Self-defense has long been understood to
include the right to use anticipatory force to address the threat of an imminent attack that
is "instant, overwhelming, [and] leaving no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation." That understanding was first articulated in the Caroline case - a dispute
involving the sinking of an American ship by British forces in 1837 - and was applied after
the adoption of the U.N. Charter by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
See RECOURSE To FORCE, supra note 119, at 97-98.
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authorized by the U.N. Security Council.13 The text of the U.N.
Charter contains no provision allowing for humanitarian
intervention in the internal affairs of a state - even in cases of
egregious human rights violations such as genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity. Many commentators have
expressed concern that tolerating humanitarian interventions may
erode the U.N. Charter's prohibition on the unilateral use of force,
or result in relativistic enforcement of that prohibition that "could
launch the international system down the slippery slope into an
abyss of anarchy." 4 1
In addition to prohibiting the unauthorized use of force by
U.N. member states, the U.N. Charter places strict constraints on
military action by regional organizations. Article 53 of the U.N.
Charter states that "no enforcement action shall be taken under
regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the
authorization of the Security Council."' 42 That prohibition is
strengthened by Article 103, which mandates the supremacy of the
U.N. Charter, stating that "[i]n the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the
present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present
139. U.N. Charter, supra note 18, art. 42 ("Should the Security Council consider that
measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate,
it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations."). Article 42 has been interpreted to allow the Security Council to authorize the
use of force by ad hoc forces made up of willing member states. RECOURSE TO FORCE,
supra note 119, at 24; see also S.C. Res. 83, supra note 121 (authorizing member states to
forcibly repel North Korean forces that had invaded South Korea); S/RES 678, supra note
121 (authorizing member states to forcibly remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait).
140. See RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 119, at 135-39. Over the past 20 years,
there have been several attempts to justify the use of force for "purely humanitarian"
purposes, the most famous being NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo to stop the
genocidal slaughter of ethnic Albanians residing in that country. That intervention - while
widely considered to be morally legitimate - was later found to be illegal under the terms
of the U.N. Charter. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo
Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned 164 (2000); see also RECOURSE
TO FORCE, supra note 119, at 163-69 (discussing negotiations in the U.N. Security Council
prior to the intervention, the military campaign, and its aftermath).
141. RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 119, at 171-72. See Michael J. Glennon, How
International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939 (2005) and Thomas M. Franck, What Happens
Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 607 (2003), for discussion on the
erosion of the prohibition on force.
142. U.N. Charter, supra note 18, art. 53, para. 1.
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Charter shall prevail.,143 Every state in the African Union is also a
member of the United Nations.1 " Thus, any humanitarian
intervention pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the
African Union must comply with the terms of the U.N. Charter's
prohibition of the unauthorized use of force.
The provisions of the U.N. Charter prohibiting the use of
force by member states or regional organizations do not, however,
necessarily require that the U.N. Security Council approve in
advance any humanitarian intervention authorized by the African
Union. To the contrary, it is well-established that Security Council
authorization is not a prerequisite for the use of force in cases
where a state consents to armed intervention in its internal
affairs. 14 Almost 65 years of U.N. practice with respect to
peacekeeping forces serves as an example of that principle.
Beginning in 1950 with the "Uniting for Peace" resolution,
the U.N. General Assembly has attempted to address gridlock in
the Security Council - usually due to the use of the veto by one of
the five permanent members to protect their political interests - by
allowing the deployment of armed peacekeeping forces to
consenting states.146 Under that resolution, peacekeepers were
dispatched without Security Council authorization in 141956 to
address a conflict over the ownership of the Suez Canal4 and in
1960 to combat a secessionist regime in the Congo.148 The
International Court of Justice upheld the legality of those actions,
reasoning that although the U.N. Security Council has the
"primary" responsibility for assuring international peace and
security, the General Assembly has the right "by means of
recommendations ... to organize peace-keeping operations, at the
143. Id. at art. 103.
144. See United Nations Member States, http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml
(last visited Mar. 23, 2010); Constitutive Act List of Countries, supra note 81.
145. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 230 (2d
ed. 2004) ("It also seems to have been accepted after the experience of Yugoslavia and
Somalia, that peacekeeping should generally be kept separate from Chapter VII actions"
in which the U.N. Security Council authorizes the use of force to address threats to
international peace and security.).
146. See RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 119, at 33-39. See Bryan D. Kreykes, A
Case for Delegation: The U.N. Security Council, Regional Conflicts, and Regional
Organizations, 11 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 1 (2008), for a discussion of Security Council
gridlock and proposed initiatives to reform that body.
147. See G.A. Res. 1000 (ES-I), U.N. Doc. A/3354 (Nov. 5, 1956).
148. See G.A. Res. 1474 (ES-IV), U.N. Doc. A/4510 (Sept. 20, 1960).
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request, or with the consent, of the States concerned." 49
Emboldened by the Court's holding, the General Assembly
continued to deploy peacekeeping forces to consenting states
throughout the Cold War. In all, 38 peacekeeping missions based
on the consent of the state in which the intervention took place
were authorized pursuant to the "Uniting for Peace" resolution
150during the U.N.'s first 50 years.
Since the end of the Cold War, U.N. peacekeeping missions
have expanded in scope to include combat operations aimed at
halting widespread human rights abuses such as genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.' That expansion was most
dramatically demonstrated by UNPROFOR, a peacekeeping
mission deployed to the former Yugoslav province of Bosnia-
Herzegovina from 1993 to 1995. UNPROFOR's mission was
originally instituted at the request of the Yugoslav government.xs
Due to ongoing genocide perpetrated by the Serbian majority of
Bosnia-Herzegovina against the country's Muslim minority,
however, the U.N. refused to abandon its peacekeeping mission
even after Croatia, a former province of Yugoslavia that had since
become an independent state, withdrew its consent to operations
on its territory. Instead, the U.N. converted UNPROFOR into a
more wide-ranging enforcement operation whose mandate
included combat operations to halt the ongoing slaughter.154
Like the aforementioned peacekeeping operations,
humanitarian intervention pursuant to the Constitutive Act of the
African Union may be based on the consent of the state in which
the intervention takes place,"' and therefore does not require the
prior approval of the U.N. Security Council. By ratifying the
Constitutive Act, each of the states in the African Union
knowingly entered into an accord whereby they consented to
armed intervention in their internal affairs to address genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Unlike states that have
149. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 163-
64 (July 20).
150. See RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 119, at 39.
151. See GRAY, supra note 145, at 165.
152. See id. at 167-68.
153. See id. at 165.
154. Id. at 232; RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 119, at 40.
155. See CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION, supra note 17, art. 4(h).
156. Id.
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accepted U.N. peacekeeping operations, however, the members of
the African Union granted a prospective and open-ended consent
by ratifying the Constitutive Act. In so doing, those states willingly
surrendered a portion of their sovereignty in order to combat the
human rights abuses that have plagued their continent.' The
mutual agreement on the part of African Union member states to
allow armed intervention in their internal affairs to put a stop to
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity renders such
intervention legitimate under both the letter and the spirit of the
U.N. Chiarter. Moreover, in light of the increasing demand within
the international community for effective measures to address
widespread human rights abuses, it is unlikely that the African
Union's humanitarian intervention mechanism will be condemned
in the court of popular international opinion.
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A MODEL OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
The humanitarian intervention mechanism contained in the
Constitutive Act of the African Union represents an encouraging
step in the evolution of international law from a system primarily
concerned with state sovereignty to one that seeks to vindicate the
rights of individuals. By requiring states to prospectively consent
to armed intervention in their internal affairs to put a stop to war
crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity, that system creates a
promising framework for addressing heinous and systematic
human rights violations such as those committed by the
Zimbabwean government in Operation Murambatsvina.
Even in cases where such humanitarian intervention can be
legally justified on the basis of a state's consent, however,
problems of political. will and limited resources remain. Those
157. Although African Union member states against whom the use of force is
authorized may attempt to revoke their consent to humanitarian intervention in their
internal affairs, such a revocation would conflict with their obligations under the
Constitutive Act. Id. Therefore, any attempt by a state to withdraw its consent to
humanitarian intervention in its internal affairs would result in an effective derogation of
the Constitutive Act. Given the economic and political benefits of African Union
membership, it is unlikely that states would be willing to renounce their membership in
order to avoid being the target of intervention. In light of the requirement that two-thirds
of African Union member states vote in favor in order to authorize intervention, the
political repercussions of a state pursuing such drastic measures would be severe, both
within the African Union and the wider international community.
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problems are especially pronounced in the context of the African
Union. Despite the existence of several urgent crises - most
notably the widespread abuse and displacement of citizens in
Darfur by the Sudanese government and the ongoing civil war in
the Democratic Republic of Congo - the African Union has yet to
authorize a humanitarian intervention to put a halt to human
rights abuses. In order to assure that such interventions are
possible, the international community should exert pressure on
African states to address humanitarian crises. But political
pressure alone will not be enough to guarantee that massive
human rights violations are stopped before they result in
irreparable loss of life and property; willing states should also
provide funding and, if requested by the African Union, armed
forces to carry out humanitarian interventions. If such aid is
provided, Africa may find it possible to use its regional
frameworks to effectively end the most egregious human rights
abuses, thereby protecting the lives and livelihoods of its most
vulnerable citizens.
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